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RECENT CASES
LBEL AND SANDER--STRicT LIABnxnY-PREss DISPATCHES-DEFAMATION BY
RADIo. The defendant newspaper published an Associated Press dispatch
which carried the imputation that the plaintiff, an attorney in the trial of a
case, had been censured for giving false testimony under oath. The charge
was untrue, and plaintiff brought an action for damages. The defendant
asked for an instruction to the effect that a newspaper which merely re-
prints a dispatch sent from a distant city by a reputable news service is
not to be held to the same responsibility for the truth as in instances
where the newspaper's own reporters write the story. The instruction was
refused and judgment for the plaintiff was affirmed. Carey v. Hearst
Publishing Co., 119 Wash. Dec. 697, 143 P (2d) 857 (1943).
The Carey case represents the first decision in Washington upon the
particular question involved. Tle holding is in accord with the usual rule
that re-publication of a' libel is actionable to the same extent as the original
release, and the repetition is not privileged by the mere fact that the
source is indicated and can ordinarily be depended upon to speak the
truth. Strict liability is the standard applied. Peck v. Tribune Co., 214
U. S. 185, 53 L. Ed. 960 (1909); 39 Am. Juris. 20, §32; Prosser on Torts, p.
819. Apparently the only authority for a more liberal view is found in
the case of Layne v. Tribune Co., 108 Fla. 177, 146 So. 234 (1933). In that
decision under practically identical facts, it was held that the publication
was not libelous per se, and that in order to set up a good cause of action,
it must be alleged and shown that the defendant was reckless or wanton
in publishing the falsehood. The Florida Court justified its departure from
the strict rule formulated at common law upon the ground that great
changes have occurred in the manner of reporting and publishing news
items, and that under such new conditions, it is unreasonable to require
newspapers to verify reports from far-distant points in order to protect
themselves in the event of error on the part of the press service. As yet,
no cases have been cited as following the Layne opinion, but at least one
writer has voiced a similar criticism of the general rule. 2 Cooley on Con-
stitutional Limitations, 8th ed., pp. 939.
Immediately following the Layne case, a flood of law review articles
were written concerning it (these are collected in Prosser on Torts, pp. 817,
820). For the most part, these articles attacked the validity of the new
view, but the advantages to be gained by such a change in the law
were also pointed out. In support of the general rule, it was indicated that
as a practical matter, a newspaper is better able to bear the loss than is the
injured individual. 81 U. PA. L. R. 779. This argument is sound so far as
it goes, but should take into consideration the fact that the primary wrong-
doer (the press service) is also liable and usually capable of compensating
the plaintiff. It does not seem unreasonable to suggest that public policy
might be better served if the injured party were required to seek his
remedy against the originator of the libel. 37 Mcm. L. R. 495. It has been
suggested that even if the plaintiff does recover damages against the press
service, his remedy will not be complete, because such an action would not
be effective in clearing him of guilt of the accusations in his home com-
munity. 46 HAav. L. R. 1032. The reply to this contention is that the plain-
tiff could attain this result by an action in equity to compel the local news-
paper to publish a retraction. 37 Mcm L. IL 495.
A problem similar to that faced by publishers confronts broadcasters.
It has been held that publication by radio is analogous to publication by
170 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [VOL. 19
newspaper, and the same standard of liability is applicable in actions
against the station owner where defamatory utterances of others are dis-
seminated through his station. Good faith is no defense. Miles v. Warmer
Inc., 172 Wash. 466, 20 P (2d) 847 (1933). It is interesting to note that the
burden upon the broadcaster has been relieved to some extent by a
recently enacted statute in Washington. WAsH. SESSION LAWS, C. 229
(1943). It provides that the broadcaster shall not be liable for defamation
by the speaker (beyond the script), if he has previously examined the
script and cuts off the broadcast immediately upon departure from the
approved matter.
There may be some merit in the arguments presented for the change
in the existing rule of law. However, modern law is developing a policy of
imposing strict liability (liability without fault) in cases where the
defendant's activity is one involving a high degree of danger to others
even though it is carried on with all possible precaution. Prosser on Torts,
Sec. 56, p. 426. An untrue publication, particularly by a newspaper or on
the radio, should be placed on the same basis because of the usual serious
injury to the plaintiff, the fact that it is irreparable, and it is generally of
doubtful utility.
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